Moral Status and Intelligent Robots
John‐Stewart Gordon, David J. Gunkel
Abstract
Abstract The great technological achievements in the recent past regarding artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and computer science make it very likely, according to many experts in the field, that we will see the advent of intelligent and autonomous robots that either match or supersede human capabilities in the midterm (within the next 50 years) or long term (within the next 100–300 years). Accordingly, this article has two main goals. First, we discuss some of the problems related to ascribing moral status to intelligent robots, and we examine three philosophical approaches—the Kantian approach, the relational approach, and the indirect duties approach—that are currently used in machine ethics to determine the moral status of intelligent robots. Second, we seek to raise broader awareness among moral philosophers of the important debates in machine ethics that will eventually affect how we conceive of key concepts and approaches in ethics and moral philosophy. The effects of intelligent and autonomous robots on our traditional ethical and moral theories and concepts will be substantial and will force us to revise and reconsider many established understandings. Therefore, it is essential to turn attention to debates over machine ethics now so that we can be better prepared to respond to the opportunities and challenges of the future.