Some Taxes Are Better Than Others: An Economic Experiment Analyzing Groundwater Management in a Spatially Explicit Aquifer
Joshua M. Duke, Zhongyuan Liu, Jordan F. Suter, Kent D. Messer, Holly A. Michael
Abstract
Abstract This paper develops a coupled hydrologic‐economic model that estimates the effects of six tax institutions that theory predicts will lead to equal amounts of aquifer withdrawal. That said, the distributive effects of the tax institutions are expected to differ because each involves different combinations of tax thresholds and side payments (returned tax revenue). The tax policies can lead to groundwater users being worse off than they would be using an unmanaged aquifer. This study explores whether the distributive impacts of specific policies that have equal marginal incentives lead to differences in the behavior of participants in an experiment involving a common pool groundwater resource. The results reveal that each of the tax policies results in approximately the same reduction in resource use but affects participants' earnings and opinions regarding the policies differently. A tax imposed on groundwater use above a threshold and without a side payment is most effective in increasing the net social benefit associated with using the aquifer; participant earnings under that scheme are almost equal to earnings from an unmanaged aquifer (1.04% less), and overall social efficiency is greater (4.34%). Unfortunately, participants tend to prefer an unmanaged aquifer and tax policies with high side‐payments—treatments that led to lower overall social efficiency. The evidence suggests that aquifer management may require a two‐fold approach: (1) a carefully selected threshold that can make water users financially indifferent between a managed and unmanaged aquifer and (2) education to increase the political acceptability of the managed aquifer policy.