Identity Theft, Deep Brain Stimulation, and the Primacy of Post‐trial Obligations
Joseph J. Fins, Amanda R. Merner, Megan S. Wright, Gabriel Lázaro‐Muñoz
Abstract
Patient narratives from two investigational deep brain stimulation trials for traumatic brain injury and obsessive-compulsive disorder reveal that injury and illness rob individuals of personal identity and that neuromodulation can restore it. The early success of these interventions makes a compelling case for continued post-trial access to these technologies. Given the centrality of personal identity to respect for persons, a failure to provide continued access can be understood to represent a metaphorical identity theft. Such a loss recapitulates the pain of an individual's initial injury or illness and becomes especially tragic because it could be prevented by robust policy. A failure to fulfill this normative obligation constitutes a breach of disability law, which would view post-trial access as a means to achieve social reintegration through this neurotechnological accommodation.