Decentralized Resilient $H_{\infty}$ Load Frequency Control for Cyber-Physical Power Systems Under DoS Attacks
Xin Zhao, Suli Zou, Zhongjing Ma
Abstract
This paper designs a decentralized resilient H <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">∞</sub> load frequency control (LFC) scheme for multi-area cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs). Under the network-based control framework, the sampled measurements are transmitted through the communication networks, which may be attacked by energy-limited denial-of-service (DoS) attacks with a characterization of the maximum count of continuous data losses (resilience index). Each area is controlled in a decentralized mode, and the impacts on one area from other areas via their interconnections are regarded as the additional load disturbance of this area. Then, the closed-loop LFC system of each area under DoS attacks is modeled as an aperiodic sampled-data control system with external disturbances. Under this modeling, a decentralized resilient H <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">∞</sub> scheme is presented to design the state-feedback controllers with guaranteed H <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">∞</sub> performance and resilience index based on a novel transmission interval-dependent loop functional method. When given the controllers, the proposed scheme can obtain a less conservative H <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">∞</sub> performance and resilience index that the LFC system can tolerate. The effectiveness of the proposed LFC scheme is evaluated on a one-area CPPS and two three-area CPPSs under DoS attacks.