Climate and Energy Transitions in Times of Environmental Backlash? The European Union ‘Green Deal’ From Adoption to Implementation
Pierre Bocquillon
Abstract
The inception of the European Union's (EU's) ‘Green Deal’ – a flagship project of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen launched to much acclaim in December 2019 – contrasts with its adoption in the final years of the Commission's term in office in 2023–2024. In 2019, unprecedented climate protests and mobilisations across Europe and the world – from the ‘Fridays for Future’ school strikes to climate marches and to more radical actions by groups like the Extinction Rebellion (XR) – pushed climate change and the energy transition to the top of the EU's political agenda. In this context, the 2019 European elections saw unprecedented successes for Green Parties across the continent, boosting the Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) parliamentary group to a record 72 members (Pearson and Rüdig, 2020). With the main centre-left and centre-right groups together failing to command a majority in Parliament, the Greens were able to pressure Ursula von der Leyen to commit to ambitious policies. The EU ‘Green Deal’ stemmed directly from this context marked by ‘enabling politicisation’ of the climate issue (Dupont et al., 2024). The EU climate law (Regulation EU 2021/1119, 2021), formally adopted in July 2021, committed the block to reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and reducing net emissions by 55% by 2030, whilst a large legislative package explicitly called ‘Fit for 55’ was proposed by the Commission that same month to achieve the headline targets. Although the Green Deal has been developed in times of crisis, the Commission and EU have held steady in their commitments (Eckert, 2021; Von Homeyer et al., 2022). Yet, the finalisation of the legislative proposals aimed at turning lofty goals into action in 2023–2024 – before the Commission's end of term and EU Parliament elections – has taken place in a starkly different context. Energy and cost of living crises, initially triggered by post-COVID-19 supply chain disruptions and dramatically heightened by the war in Ukraine leading to energy supply disruptions and commodity price hikes across Europe, have increasingly fuelled concerns about the costs of climate and energy transitions (Goldthau and Youngs, 2023; Kuzemko et al., 2022). Although energy prices have fallen since the end of 2023, cost of living and energy security issues have remained salient. Politically, this context has been instrumentalised by populist and radical right parties to mobilise against the climate and energy transitions (Yazar and Haarstad, 2023), whilst the centre has also become increasingly cautious, especially the centre right. At the European level, this is most evident for the European People's Party (EPP), which has increasingly contested Green Deal legislation, most notably the Nature Restoration Law (Regulation EU 2024/1991, 2024) (Tosun, 2023). This shift is in part a response to protests and contestations of energy and climate legislation across the continent, notably the highly covered farmer's protests starting in late 2023 and continuing throughout the spring of 2024 (Politico, 2024; Reuters, 2023). The June 2024 European Parliament elections reflect this new context, with a rise of far-right groups, whilst the Greens were the main losers along with the liberals (Hix et al., 2024). Against this background of ‘constraining politicisation’ of climate policy (Dupont et al., 2024), this article asks whether 2023–2024 represents a turning point for EU commitments to the climate and energy transitions. As a new European Commission and Parliament set in, it is a good time to assess progress and challenges for the EU ‘Green Deal’. Has it been faltering? What are the prospects for its implementation and for renewing the EU's green ambitions? I argue that, overall, the agenda for climate action and energy system decarbonisation has proved remarkably resilient. EU institutions and member states have remained committed to delivering the climate and energy dimensions of the Green Deal agenda by the end of the von der Leyen Commission's term and have mostly delivered. Yet, cost concerns, protests and their political use by right-wing populists also raise questions for implementation, possibly dampening ambitions going forward. This article first reviews the progress of the Green Deal legislation and whether the EU has delivered on its ambitions, focusing in particular on energy and climate change. It then assesses the seemingly waning momentum for climate action and the recent ‘green backlash’. Finally, it reflects on the prospects for Green Deal implementation and renewal, drawing insights from past crises and their effects on EU environmental and climate policies. It concludes that, whilst the energy and climate transition agenda is likely to prove resilient, its framing and focus may be changing in the context of domestic politicisation of the climate and energy transition and global geopolitical competition. In its initial communication launching the ‘Green Deal’, the European Commission (2019) presented a wide-ranging strategy to ‘make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050’, protect biodiversity, create a circular economy, curb pollution and mobilise finance for the green transition, all whilst boosting the competitiveness of European industry and ensuring a just transition for the affected regions and workers. The implementation of this strategy has led to the proposal and subsequent adoption of a wide range of policy packages and individual laws across different sectors, from climate and energy to agriculture, transport and the environment. Since its launch as a core priority of the ‘geopolitical Commission’ and over the course of its evolution, the contours of the Green Deal as a political object have remained ill-defined. This is in part because it is a cross-cutting strategy reflecting the multisectoral, complex and evolving nature of the climate crisis, which requires climate policy integration across all areas (Dupont et al., 2024). This is also politically deliberate: to reframe and aggregate new and related initiatives as part of an all-encompassing, purposeful and popular narrative. The EU steamed ahead throughout 2023 and the first half of 2024 to finish off the negotiation and adoption of remaining Green Deal files ahead of the June 2024 EU elections, marking the end of the term of both the ninth legislature of the European Parliament and the first von der Leyen Commission. Uncertainty arose when the Commission Vice President and Green Deal chief, Frans Timmermans, known as a heavyweight skilled negotiator and vocal proponent of the Green Deal, left his post to compete in Dutch elections and lead a left-green alliance (Euractiv, 2023a). He was replaced by Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič and the new controversial Dutch appointee Wopke Hoekstra, criticised for his past employment at Shell and lacklustre record on climate (Taylor, 2023a). Yet, this did not derail work on finalising the Green Deal, which was successful overall with a majority of files adopted and a few blocked or withdrawn due to delays or intractable divisions.1 Looking specifically at the ‘Fit for 55’ package, which implements the headline emission reduction targets and energy transition objectives, it was originally composed of 13 legislative proposals, later extended to 19.2 As of July 2024, all proposals but one had been adopted by the co-legislators. Some of the legislation updates and strengthens pre-existing legislation, whilst new policies are also introduced. A significant step was the reform of the flagship EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS), adopted in April 2023, along with a raft of associated laws. It accelerates the reduction of emission allowances for energy-intensive industries and the power sector; progressively phases out free allowances; progressively includes shipping within the ETS; strengthens the rules for aviation emissions by phasing out free allowances for domestic flights and implementing the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) for extra-European flights; and revises the market stability reserve that aims to maintain stable and effective carbon prices. The reform aims to achieve an emission reduction of 62% in covered sectors by 2030, compared to 2005, a reduction slightly higher than initially proposed by the Commission. In addition, a new and distinct ETS is introduced for buildings, road transport and additional sectors – all considered hard to decarbonise – that apply to fuel distributors from 2027. A new Social Climate Fund, mostly supplied by revenues from the new ETS, aims to help vulnerable households, small companies and transport users cope with associated costs. This is a recognition of the concrete impacts and justice implications of this new scheme and an attempt at diffusing contestation to avoid a replay of protracted opposition, such as the ‘Yellow Vest’ protests that rocked France in 2018–2020 following an increase in fuel taxes. An innovative and internationally controversial piece of legislation is the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which imposes a carbon tax on imports of products in carbon-intensive industries. CBAM is to be progressively phased in from 2026 in line with the phasing out of free allowances within the ETS, aiming to put EU and third-country industries on a level playing field and avoid carbon leakage – the outsourcing of industrial emissions to jurisdictions with lower emission standards and costs. In sectors not covered by the ETS (road and domestic maritime transport, buildings, agriculture, waste and small industries), emission reductions are defined by the Effort Sharing Regulation. The revision, adopted in March 2023, increases the 2030 EU-wide target from 29% to 40%, compared with 2005, and distributes the effort with binding national targets. Along with this, the revised Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) regulation of March 2023 includes an increased EU-level target of at least 310 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent net removals of greenhouse gases for 2030, with associated and binding national targets. A new regulation on tracking and reducing methane emissions in the energy sector, adopted in November 2023, aims to implement the Global Methane Pledge signed along with over 100 countries at the UN Climate COP26. It requires the oil, gas and coal industries to measure, report and verify methane emissions and to put in place mitigation measures for leak detection and repair, as well as for closed wells and mines. For transport, a hard-to-decarbonise sector, a number of new laws were passed in addition to ETS provisions. The regulation on CO2 emission standards for cars and vans, updated and finally adopted in March 2023, introduces progressive emissions reduction targets, including a 100% emission reduction target for 2035, which effectively amounts to a complete phase-out of combustion car and van sales. In parallel, and to facilitate the growth of electric vehicles, the regulation on alternative fuel infrastructure finalised that same month mandates the installation of recharging stations for cars and vans every 60 km, as well as hydrogen refuelling stations for cars and lorries in all urban nodes from 2030 onwards. For shipping, a July 2023 agreement on the FuelEU maritime initiative mandates a reduction of greenhouse gas intensity for the energy used on-board ships by up to 80% by 2050, whilst promoting the use of renewable and low-carbon fuels. Concerning aviation, the ReFuelEU Aviation initiative adopted in October 2023 aims to promote sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) (e.g., advanced biofuels, renewable and low-carbon hydrogen and recycled fuels meeting sustainability and emissions-saving criteria). It sets obligations for fuel suppliers to ensure that aviation fuels contain minimum shares of SAF (from 2025) and synthetic fuels (from 2030), increasing progressively until 2050. The energy sector also saw key proposals updated. The revision of the flagship renewable energy directive, finally adopted in October 2023, sets a binding target of 42.5% renewable energy in EU final energy consumption by 2030 (up from a paltry 32.5%), with an extra 2.5% indicative top-up to reach the 45% supported by the most ambitious member states and European Parliament. The directive does not set binding national renewable energy targets but introduces a mix of binding and non-binding renewable sub-targets in transport, industry, buildings and district heating and cooling, whilst also mandating faster permitting procedures for renewable energy projects. Increased ambitions are in part the results of the REPowerEU plan of 18 May 2022, adopted in the context of the war in Ukraine and aiming at reducing EU dependence on Russian gas (Von Homeyer et al., 2023). 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The EU Green Deal from its inception to its the and – or – of the politicisation of climate change (Dupont et al., 2024; et al., 2022). In 2019, climate pushed climate change – an and policy – on top of the EU's political agenda. In this context, the Commission proposed a cross-cutting and ambitious Green Deal, wide across member states and the political In this politicisation proved In the of the Green Deal ahead of EU elections has been marked by a different context, with a of the as well as the radical right and centre right the Green Deal agenda to it – a of ‘constraining politicisation’ (Dupont et al., 2024). 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