Robust three‐factor authentication protocol for satellite communication systems
Yulei Chen, Jianhua Chen
Abstract
Summary The rapid development of satellite communications has brought great convenience to people's lives, as well as huge security challenges. In order to guarantee the security of users, a large number of authentication protocols have been proposed. Recently, Xu et al. proposed an improved mutual authentication protocol based on perfect forward secrecy for satellite communications. In this paper, we will point out that Xu et al.'s protocol cannot resist the offline password guessing attack and the replay attack and fails to provide user untraceability. To overcome these weaknesses, we propose a robust three‐factor‐based authentication protocol for satellite communication systems and analyze its correctness using Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic. In addition, the descriptive security analysis shows that our protocol is safe and robust against various attacks. By comparing with other related protocols, we find that our protocol has better performance.