Incentive Mechanism Design for Federated Learning: A Two-stage Stackelberg Game Approach
Guiliang Xiao, Mingjun Xiao, Guoju Gao, Sheng Zhang, Hui Zhao, Xiang Zou
Abstract
Federated Learning (FL) is a newly-emerging distributed ML model, where a server can coordinate multiple workers to cooperatively train a learning model by using their private datasets, while ensuring these datasets not to be revealed to others. In this paper, we focus on the incentive mechanism design for FL systems. Taking the incentives into consideration, we first design two utility functions for the server and workers, respectively. Then, we model the corresponding utility optimization problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game by seeing the server as a leader and the workers as some followers. Next, we derive an optimal Equilibrium solution for the both stages of the whole game. Based on this solution, we design an incentive mechanism that can ensure the server to achieve the optimal utility, while stimulating workers to do their best to train the ML model. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations to demonstrate the significant performance of the proposed mechanism.