Responsibility and Consciousness
Matt King, Peter Carruthers
Abstract
Abstract It is natural to think that consciousness is in some sense required for responsibility. A lack of awareness typically excuses (or at least mitigates blame). Meanwhile, the emerging consensus from the cognitive sciences suggests that much of our mental lives is unconscious. This chapter examines the prospects for a consciousness requirement against the backdrop of these findings. It defends the view that while consciousness is important for responsibility, it is not a necessary condition. Additionally, the chapter provides a framework for understanding the ways in which consciousness might be relevant for responsibility, and it critically assesses one leading defense of a consciousness requirement. Particular attention is paid to three kinds of cases involving unconscious processes: automaticism (like sleepwalking), forgetting, and implicit bias. The chapter concludes by considering one possible implication of the view defended: that the traditional use of consciousness in marking important divisions of mens rea in the criminal law may be misguided.