A Formal Approach to Physics-based Attacks in Cyber-physical Systems
Ruggero Lanotte, Massimo Merro, Andrei Munteanu, Luca Viganò
Abstract
We apply formal methods to lay and streamline theoretical foundations to reason about Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and physics-based attacks, i.e., attacks targeting physical devices. We focus on a formal treatment of both integrity and denial of service attacks to sensors and actuators of CPSs, and on the timing aspects of these attacks. Our contributions are fourfold. (1) We define a hybrid process calculus to model both CPSs and physics-based attacks. (2) We formalise a threat model that specifies MITM attacks that can manipulate sensor readings or control commands to drive a CPS into an undesired state; we group these attacks into classes and provide the means to assess attack tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given class of attacks, based on a proper notion of most powerful physics-based attack. (3) We formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible quantifications of the success chances of an attack. (4) We illustrate our definitions and results by formalising a non-trivial running example in U PPAAL SMC, the statistical extension of the U PPAAL model checker; we use U PPAAL SMC as an automatic tool for carrying out a static security analysis of our running example in isolation and when exposed to three different physics-based attacks with different impacts.