Federated Learning Detection of Cyberattacks on Virtual Synchronous Machines Under Grid-Forming Control Using Physics-Informed LSTM
Ali Khaleghi, Soroush Oshnoei, Saeed Mirzajani
Abstract
The global shift toward clean production, like using renewable energy, has significantly decreased the use of synchronous machines (SMs), which help maintain stability and control, causing serious frequency stability issues in power systems with low inertia. Fractional order controller-based virtual synchronous machines (FOC-VSMs) have become a promising option, but they rely on communication networks to work together in real time, causing them to be at risk of cyberattacks, especially from false data injection attacks (FDIAs). This paper suggests a new way to detect FDI attacks using a federated physics-informed long short-term memory (PI-LSTM) network. Each FOC-VSM uses its data to train a PI-LSTM, which keeps the information private but still helps it learn from a common model that understands various operating conditions. The PI-LSTM incorporates physical constraints derived from the FOC-VSM swing equation, facilitating residual-based anomaly detection that is sensitive to minor deviations in control dynamics, such as altered inertia or falsified frequency signals. Unlike traditional LSTMs, the physics-informed architecture minimizes false positives arising from benign disturbances. We assessed the proposed method on an IEEE 9-bus test system featuring two FOC-VSMs. The results show that our method can successfully detect FDI attacks while handling regular changes, proving it could be a strong solution.