Computation Offloading in Hierarchical Multi-Access Edge Computing Based on Contract Theory and Bayesian Matching Game
Chunxia Su, Fang Ye, Tingting Liu, Yuan Tian, Zhu Han
Abstract
Multi-access edge computing (MEC) has emerged as a promising paradigm because of its good performance for computation-intensive and latency-critical applications. However, the enormous computing requests from computation service subscribers (CSSs) still cannot be satisfied by pre-existing edge computation nodes (ECNs). To fully utilize the advantage of the MEC network, a hierarchical computation offloading framework is developed under network virtualization (NV) scenario. Accordingly, a two-step sequential process is designed to stimulate the proposed framework. In the first step, an incentive mechanism is proposed in which more temporary ECNs can be motivated by MEC operator and then join the MEC network. Without perfect ECN information, the optimal contract items (the ECN's CPU contribution and reward) between the MEC operator and ECNs can be achieved by taking account of individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatible (IC) constraints. After acquiring the ECNs' CPU contributions, the computing resource allocation problem between the ECNs and CSSs is then considered in the second step. Since the CSSs have private information, a Bayesian matching game with externality is leveraged to model the problem. Whereas, the conventional resident-oriented Gale-Shapley (RGS) algorithm cannot ensure the stability. Hence, an iterative matching algorithm that can always converge to stable results is developed. Finally, simulation results demonstrate that our proposed two-step sequential decision process can significantly improve social welfare considering the practical scenarios, with reasonable computational complexity.