How Harms Can Be Better than Benefits: Reply to Carlson, Johansson, and Risberg
Neil Feit
Abstract
I respond here to an argument given recently in this journal by Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and Olle Risberg. The authors object to the counterfactual comparative account of harm. They argue that, on this account, an action that would harm the agent might leave her better off than would some alternative action that would benefit her, and they object to this implication. By appealing to group or plural harm, I argue that their objection fails.
Topics & Concepts
Counterfactual thinkingHarmPluralArgument (complex analysis)Action (physics)Object (grammar)EpistemologyLaw and economicsPsychologyPhilosophyPositive economicsSociologyEconomicsSocial psychologyMedicineLinguisticsQuantum mechanicsPhysicsInternal medicinePsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentFree Will and AgencyNeuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations