Energy Attacks in the Battery-less Internet of Things
Luca Mottola, Arslan Hameed, Thiemo Voigt
Abstract
We study how ambient energy harvesting may be used as an attack vector in the battery-less Internet of Things (IoT). Battery-less IoT devices rely on ambient energy harvesting and are employed in a multitude of applications, including safety-critical ones such as biomedical implants. Due to scarce energy intakes and limited energy buffers, their executions become intermittent, alternating periods of active operation with periods of recharging energy buffers. We reveal how, by exerting limited control on ambient energy one can create situations of livelock, denial of service, and starvation, without physical device access. We call these situations energy attacks. We detail, analyze, and quantitatively demonstrate how these attacks can be applied to battery-less IoT devices, and illustrate their consequences on a system's regular operation.