A Cyber-Physical Power System Risk Assessment Model Against Cyberattacks
Kang Yan, Xuan Liu, Yidan Lu, Fanglu Qin
Abstract
With the integration of cyber devices into power systems, such as information communication technology devices and intelligent electronic devices, there are currently a large number of software vulnerabilities (SVs) in cyber devices, which are probably used to obtain the authority of cyber devices for malicious attackers and be carried out subsequently severe attacks on power systems. Thus, it is inappropriate to only consider the power risks as the risk assessment for the system with the strong coupling between cyber systems and power systems. In this article, we investigate a dynamic risk assessment model for the cyber-physical power system (CPPS) against cyberattacks, combining the network security vulnerability of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system in a substation and physical consequences in power systems caused by it under malicious control. By construction, a dynamic network security vulnerability assessment method for the SCADA system is well studied by considering SVs and deployed network security defense measures, which is also corrected by the propagation characteristics. Moreover, we estimate physical consequences by minimum shedding loads in N-1 contingencies caused by the SCADA system in a substation under malicious control. Finally, simulations on modified IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems verify the proposed model's effectiveness, highlighting the importance of network security in CPPS.