Jamming of LoRa PHY and Countermeasure
Ningning Hou, Xianjin Xia, Yuanqing Zheng
Abstract
LoRaWAN forms a one-hop star topology where LoRa nodes send data via one-hop uplink transmission to a LoRa gateway. If the LoRa gateway can be jammed by attackers, it may not be able to receive any data from any nodes in the network. Our empirical study shows that although the LoRa physical layer (PHY) is robust and resilient by design, it is still vulnerable to synchronized jamming chirps. Potential protection solutions (e.g., collision recovery, parallel decoding) may fail to extract LoRa packets if an attacker transmits synchronized jamming chirps at higher power. To protect the LoRa PHY from such attacks, we propose a new protection method that can separate LoRa chirps from jamming chirps by leveraging their difference in power domain. We note that the new protection solution is orthogonal to existing solutions that leverage the chirp misalignment in the time domain or the frequency disparity in the frequency domain. We conduct experiments with COTS LoRa nodes and software-defined radios with varied experiment settings such as different spreading factors, bandwidths, and code rates. Results show that synchronized jamming chirps at high power can jam all previous solutions, whereas our protection solution can effectively protect LoRa gateways from the jamming attacks.