Intrinsic value, sovereignty rights, and sentient animals in Antarctica
Alfonso Donoso
Abstract
Two things central to the Antarctic Treaty System fill the minds of ethicists and political theorists the more often they reflect upon them: territorial sovereignty (AT, IV.2) and the intrinsic value of Antarctica (Protocol, art.3). Regarding its intrinsic value, in the first half of the paper I argue that to give adequate consideration to the different morally significant constituent parts of Antarctica, it is necessary to recognise sentient animals as a fundamental source of intrinsic value. In the second part of the paper, I look at the implications this interpretation would have particularly, but not only, for those States with sovereignty claims over the continent. The conclusion I draw is twofold. On the one hand, State sovereignty in Antarctica would have to become conditional to acting on the continent in ways that are consistent with the respect owed to wild sentient animals. On the other hand, claimant States and State parties would be required to revisit and amend domestic policies that generate direct harm or unreasonable risk to wild animals in the white continent, even when performed far away from Antarctica.