Causal effects and counterfactual conditionals: contrasting Rubin, Lewis and Pearl
Keith A. Markus
Abstract
Abstract Rubin and Pearl offered approaches to causal effect estimation and Lewis and Pearl offered theories of counterfactual conditionals. Arguments offered by Pearl and his collaborators support a weak form of equivalence such that notation from the rival theory can be re-purposed to express Pearl’s theory in a way that is equivalent to Pearl’s theory expressed in its native notation. Nonetheless, the many fundamental differences between the theories rule out any stronger form of equivalence. A renewed emphasis on comparative research can help to guide applications, further develop each theory, and better understand their relative strengths and weaknesses.
Topics & Concepts
PearlCounterfactual thinkingNotationEquivalence (formal languages)Causal theory of referenceEpistemologyCounterfactual conditionalStrengths and weaknessesCausal inferenceMathematical economicsSociologyMathematicsLinguisticsPhilosophyEconometricsTheologyAdvanced Causal Inference TechniquesBayesian Modeling and Causal InferenceDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics