Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality
Keshav Singh
Abstract
This chapter defends an account of moral worth. Moral worth is a status that some, but not all, morally right actions have. Unlike with merely right actions, when an agent performs a morally worthy action, she is necessarily creditworthy for doing the right thing. The chapter begins by arguing that two dominant views of moral worth have been unable to fully capture this necessary connection. On one view, an action is morally worthy if and only if its agent is motivated by the features of the action that make it right. On the other, an action is morally worthy if and only if its agent is motivated by the action’s rightness itself. But neither of these views can capture the connection between moral worth and creditworthiness, because each leaves room for cases of accidentally doing the right thing. The chapter then defends a new account: the Guise of Moral Reasons Account. On this account, morally worthy actions are right actions that are motivated by moral reasons <italic>as such</italic>. This account rules out cases of accidentally doing the right thing, thus capturing the necessary connection between moral worth and creditworthiness for doing the right thing.