Physical Layer Security of In-Home PLC Systems: Analysis Based on a Measurement Campaign
Ândrei Camponogara, H. Vincent Poor, Moisés V. Ribeiro
Abstract
This article investigates the physical layer security (PLS) of a broadband in-home power line communication (PLC) system when a malicious and passive PLC device tries to eavesdrop upon private information sent by a PLC transmitter to a legitimate PLC receiver. In this setting, the ergodic achievable secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability, effective secrecy throughput, and wiretap code rates are numerically evaluated with the use of a data set obtained from a measurement campaign carried out in several Brazilian houses. This data set comprises PLC channel estimates and measured additive noises considering four distinct sets of transmitter, legitimate receiver, and eavesdropper positions. Numerical results, covering three distinct frequency bands (1.7-30 MHz, 1.7-50 MHz, and 1.7-86 MHz), quantitatively show, in practice, the level of vulnerability of broadband in-home PLC systems in terms of PLS and offer some directions for an appropriate design of PLC modems to improve PLS.