MoLE: Mitigation of Side-channel Attacks against SGX via Dynamic Data Location Escape
Fan Lang, Wei Wang, Lingjia Meng, Jingqiang Lin, Qiongxiao Wang, Linli Lu
Abstract
Numerous works have experimentally shown that Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs) and related threats, including transient execution attacks. These threats compromise the security of SGX-protected apps. Obfuscating data access patterns is a realistic way to guard against these threats. However, existing defenses impose either too much performance overhead or additional usage restrictions (such as multithreading). Furthermore, these obfuscation schemes may no longer work if the attacker has the capacity to single-step the target application.
Topics & Concepts
Guard (computer science)Computer scienceSide channel attackCompromiseComputer securityOverhead (engineering)Security guardSoftwareComputer networkCryptographyOperating systemLawProgramming languagePolitical scienceSecurity and Verification in ComputingAdvanced Malware Detection TechniquesCloud Data Security Solutions