Should Moral Error Theorists Make Do with Make-Believe?
Jessica Isserow
Abstract
Abstract According to moral fictionalists, moral error theorists ought to preserve moral discourse in the spirit of a useful fiction. Moral fictionalists make two key promises: that adopting fictionalist attitudes like make-believe will (i) secure many of the practical benefits of our error-ridden moral practices and (ii) help us to avoid the epistemic costs of preserving our erroneous moral beliefs. Olson (2014) identifies a tension here: any efforts to keep the first promise will compromise the fictionalist’s ability to keep the second, and vice versa. The author of this chapter argues that the epistemic promise isn’t in jeopardy. However, she also argues that a proper appreciation of why the fictionalist can make good on her epistemic promise casts doubt upon whether she really can make good on her practical one. Make-believe is sufficiently distinct from belief to immunize fictionalists from any illicit moral believing, but arguably too distinct to secure the benefits of moral believing.