Locking by Untuning: A Lock-Less Approach for Analog and Mixed-Signal IC Security
Mohamed Elshamy, Alhassan Sayed, Marie‐Minerve Louërat, Hassan Aboushady, Haralampos‐G. Stratigopoulos
Abstract
We propose an antipiracy security approach for programmable analog and mixed-signal (AMS) integrated circuits (ICs). The security approach relies on functionality locking by leveraging the inherent programmability and utilizing the configuration settings as secret keys or, equivalently, the programming bits as key bits. When invalid keys are applied, the circuit is untuned and, as a result, its functionality breaks, i.e., at least one of the performances violates its specification. As long as the calibration algorithm that produces the configuration settings can be kept secret, the proposed approach can serve as a countermeasure against all types of counterfeiting, i.e., cloning, overbuilding, remarking, and recycling. An important advantage of the proposed approach is that it is lock-less. It leaves the design intact, there is no change to the design flow, and there are no performance penalty and no area or power overheads due to the lock operation. We demonstrate it on a <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\Sigma \Delta $ </tex-math></inline-formula> analog-to-digital converter (ADC) with 194-bit programmability and complex calibration algorithm used in the context of highly digitized, multistandard RF receivers.