Impact Assessment and Defense for Smart Grids With FDIA Against AMI
Jichao Bi, Fengji Luo, Gaoqi Liang, Xiaofan Yang, Shibo He, Zhao Yang Dong
Abstract
Cyber-physical security has been becoming an important issue for many critical infrastructures in human society, including electrical power grids. This paper proposes an impact assessment framework for smart grids suffering false data injection attack against smart meters. Firstly, the propagation model of malicious false data codes in smart meter communication networks is established. Based on this, a security-constrained economic dispatch model is formulated to assess how false data codes would mislead the grid operator's actions. A defense strategy is proposed, which enhances the grid's vulnerability through effectively deploying defense resources in smart meter networks. Extensive numerical simulations are conducted to evaluate the impact of different attack scenarios as well as the effectiveness of the defense strategy.