Detecting Hardware Trojans in PCBs Using Side Channel Loopbacks
Hammond Pearce, Virinchi Roy Surabhi, P. Krishnamurthy, Joshua Trujillo, Ramesh Karri, Farshad Khorrami
Abstract
Malicious modifications to printed circuit boards (PCBs) are known as hardware Trojans. These may arise when malafide third parties alter PCBs premanufacturing or postmanufacturing and are a concern in safety-critical applications, such as industrial control systems. In this research, we examine how data-driven detection can be utilized to detect such Trojans at run-time. We develop a flexible and reconfigurable PCB test bed derived from the popular open-source programmable logic controller (PLC) platform “OpenPLC.” We then develop a Trojan detection framework, which utilizes and analyzes multimodal side channels (e.g., timing, magnetic signals, power, and hardware performance counters). We consider defender-configurable input/output (I/O) loopback test, comparison with design-document baselines, and magnetometer-aided monitoring of system behavior under defender-chosen excitations. Our approach can extend to golden-free environments. Golden (known-good) versions of the PCBs are assumed not available, but design information, datasheets, and component-level data are available. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on a range of Trojans instantiated in the test bed.