Prescribed-Time Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Pursuit-Evasion Game
Lei Xue, Jianfeng Ye, Yongbao Wu, Jian Liu, Donald C. Wunsch
Abstract
Dear Editor, This letter is concerned with prescribed-time Nash equilibrium (PTNE) seeking problem in a pursuit-evasion game (PEG) involving agents with second-order dynamics. In order to achieve the priorgiven and user-defined convergence time for the PEG, a PTNE seeking algorithm has been developed to facilitate collaboration among multiple pursuers for capturing the evader without the need for any global information. Then, it is theoretically proved that the prescribed-time convergence of the designed algorithm for achieving Nash equilibrium of PEG. Eventually, the effectiveness of the PTNE method was validated by numerical simulation results.
Topics & Concepts
Nash equilibriumMathematical economicsSymmetric equilibriumPursuit-evasionEpsilon-equilibriumEconomicsBest responseGame theoryEquilibrium selectionMicroeconomicsComputer scienceRepeated gameArtificial intelligenceGuidance and Control SystemsExtremum Seeking Control SystemsComputational Fluid Dynamics and Aerodynamics