Morality's role in the Black Sheep Effect: When and why ingroup members are judged more harshly than outgroup members for the same transgression
Simone Tang, Steven Shepherd, Aaron C. Kay
Abstract
Abstract When and why might someone judge an ingroup transgressor more harshly than an outgroup transgressor? Taking a social functionalist perspective, we argue that morality is central to this phenomenon–the Black Sheep Effect–and that it is driven by social cohesion concerns. Using mediation and moderation methods across our studies, we find that people judge ingroup (vs. outgroup) transgressors more harshly because of concerns regarding ingroup social cohesion (Studies 1a–4). We also find that ingroup derogation is stronger for moral transgressions than weak or non‐moral transgressions (Studies 2 and 3). Throughout our studies, we address alternative explanations, including moral relativism, naïve realism, moral parochialism and belief in a just world. Our work speaks to the emerging contention around the reliability of the Black Sheep Effect by noting when and why it surfaces.