Data-Driven Resilient Automatic Generation Control Against False Data Injection Attacks
Chunyu Chen, Yang Chen, Junbo Zhao, Kaifeng Zhang, Ming Ni, Bixing Ren
Abstract
With the advancement of communication technologies and the development of the smart grid, today's physical power systems present an ever-growing dependency on cyber resources. It increases cyber vulnerabilities, causing safety and system stability concerns. In this article, a data-driven resilient automatic generation control (AGC) scheme is proposed under a false data injection attack (FDIA). The key idea is to identify the relationship between AGC signals and system operational conditions. This is achieved by the proposed regression-based FDIA signal predictions, including sequence-to-point prediction and the long short-term memory network-based prediction. It allows us to reconstruct the AGC control signals without being affected by FDIAs and to attenuate attacks in the closed control loop, thus alleviating the impact of FDIA on system performance. Numerical results carried out on the benchmark systems validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.