Agency and goal-directed choice
Mimi Liljeholm
Abstract
In philosophy, agency is construed in terms of desires and means-end beliefs as reasons for actions. Psychological theories of goal-directed behavior provide a formal bridge between objective contingency knowledge and subjective beliefs, missing from such accounts. In this review, I argue that, because they conflate contingency and reward, theories of goal-directed behavior are nonetheless themselves unsuitable as accounts of agency. I then review behavioral and neuroscientific data suggesting that the recently proposed construct of instrumental divergence might serve as a normative and descriptive psychological index of agency that constrains and motivates goal-directed choice.
Topics & Concepts
Agency (philosophy)NormativeConstruct (python library)ContingencyPsychologyConflationSocial psychologyEpistemologyComputer scienceProgramming languagePhilosophyFree Will and AgencyPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentNeural and Behavioral Psychology Studies