Lady Lovelace’s Objection: The Turing–Hartree Disputes Over the Meaning of Digital Computers, 1946–1951
Bernardo Gonçalves
Abstract
Can machines think? Or can they do “whatever we know how to order” them to perform? Should machines be liberated from slavery and given “fair play” to “compete with men in all purely intellectual fields”? Or should this be associated with a fashion that decries “human reason” and a path that “leads straight to Nazism”? In the postwar years, these questions were debated by Alan Turing and Douglas Hartree, who differed in their interpretations of the digital computer as a new piece of science and technology. Hartree emphasized its unprecedented calculation speed and envisioned applications in physics, logistics, energy, and warfare. Turing, who envisioned applications in biology and cognition, emphasized its potential to outperform humans intellectually, including capabilities considered distinctly human, which Hartree downplayed by mobilizing the notes of Ada Lovelace. This paper examines the Turing-Hartree disputes and draws a parallel between their positions and their perspectives on postwar Britain.