Toward Green and Efficient Blockchain for Energy Trading: A Noncooperative Game Approach
Zheng Bao, Changbing Tang, Xiaodong Xie, Guanrong Chen, Feilong Lin, Zheng Zheng
Abstract
Blockchain has gained significant adoption in energy trading, offering benefits for both economy and environment. Consensus, in particular, is a decisive factor for blockchain-based energy trading systems to operate efficiently and securely. However, the consensuses currently applied have been criticized for being too energy intensive or not sufficiently decentralized, which counteracts the positive effect of energy trading. Besides, consensus and energy trading are treated separately in many energy trading blockchain-based studies. In this article, we propose a green and efficient consortium blockchain-enabled transaction system for energy trading, meeting the requirement of low energy consumption under security. We then design a two-stage consensus mechanism called proof-of-energy that is coupled to trading through “energy” and naturally uses the monetary rewards to stimulate prosumer participation. Specifically, it retains a strong degree of decentralization, which selects a dynamic delegation with high historical energy generation and motivates delegates to compete for new blocks by solving a meaningful puzzle. Furthermore, a variable block reward is investigated as the incentive to regulate trading and consensus behavior within a reasonable range of energy consumption. Finally, we design a two-layer iterative algorithm to obtain the optimal consensus strategy and block rewards, taking the noncooperative game approach with the consideration of the strategy effect on the pricing model. Our simulation results show that the proposed blockchain-enabled system has a high energy efficiency ratio that improves the social welfare and reduces the consensus overhead.