The Separate Clock Drift Matched Filter to Detect Time Synchronization Attacks Toward Global Navigation Satellite Systems
Weiyu Gao, Hong Li, Minghan Zhong, Mingquan Lu
Abstract
This article is concerned with the security problem of industrial networks. Smart grids, telecommunications, and many other wide-area networks heavily depend on the time synchronization service of the global navigation satellite system (GNSS). This service is exposed to the time synchronization attack (TSA) which can spoof GNSS timing results and bring serious consequences. Therefore, to improve the time security of networks, a novel TSA detection method named the separate clock drift matched filter (SCD-MF) is introduced. It aims at concealed TSA signals that would not bring conspicuous abnormalities in positioning or timing solutions. This method works by monitoring the synchronicity of signal pseudorange measurements, which are expected to be synchronously changed by concealed TSA signals. This article also presents real-world experiment results. TSA detection experiments are done on a self-developed testbed that contains a real-time TSA spoofer. Compared with two benchmark methods, the SCD-MF shows better detection abilities in different conditions. Moreover, the detection performance of the SCD-MF method is analyzed both theoretically and experimentally.