Kernel extension verification is untenable
Jinghao Jia, Raj Sahu, A. Oswald, Dan Williams, Michael Le, Tianyin Xu
Abstract
The emergence of verified eBPF bytecode is ushering in a new era of safe kernel extensions. In this paper, we argue that eBPF's verifier---the source of its safety guarantees---has become a liability. In addition to the well-known bugs and vulnerabilities stemming from the complexity and ad hoc nature of the in-kernel verifier, we highlight a concerning trend in which escape hatches to unsafe kernel functions (in the form of helper functions) are being introduced to bypass verifier-imposed limitations on expressiveness, unfortunately also bypassing its safety guarantees. We propose safe kernel extension frameworks using a balance of not just static but also lightweight runtime techniques. We describe a design centered around kernel extensions in safe Rust that will eliminate the need of the in-kernel verifier, improve expressiveness, allow for reduced escape hatches, and ultimately improve the safety of kernel extensions.