Experimental Side-Channel-Secure Quantum Key Distribution
Chi Zhang, Xiao‐Long Hu, Cong Jiang, Jiu-Peng Chen, Yang Liu, Weijun Zhang, Zong‐Wen Yu, Hao Li, Lixing You, Zhen Wang, Xiang‐Bin Wang, Qiang Zhang, Jian-Wei Pan
Abstract
Quantum key distribution can provide unconditionally secure key exchange for remote users in theory. In practice, however, in most quantum key distribution systems, quantum hackers might steal the secure keys by observing the side channels in the emitted photons, such as the photon frequency spectrum, emission time, propagation direction, spatial angular momentum, and so on. It is hard to prevent such kinds of attacks because side channels may exist in many dimensions of the emitted photons. Here we report an experimental realization of a side-channel-secure quantum key distribution protocol which is not only measurement-device independent, but also immune to all side-channel attacks to the photons emitted from Alice's and Bob's labs. We achieve a secure key rate of 1.73×10^{-6} per pulse through 50 km fiber spools.