Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm
Erik Carlson
Abstract
Abstract In a recent article in this journal, I claimed that the widely held counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA) violates two very plausible principles about harm and prudential reasons. Justin Klocksiem argues, in a reply, that CCA is in fact compatible with these principles. In this rejoinder, I shall try to show that Klocksiem’s defense of CCA fails.
Topics & Concepts
Counterfactual thinkingPhilosophy of medicineHarmOntologyLaw and economicsPolitical philosophyEpistemologyPhilosophyPositive economicsPolitical scienceEconomicsLawMedicinePoliticsAlternative medicinePathologyPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentFree Will and AgencyNeuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations