Certificateless Provable Data Possession Scheme With Provable Security in the Standard Model Suitable for Cloud Storage
Lunzhi Deng, Bo Wang, Tao Wang, Shuai Feng, Siwei Li
Abstract
Provable data possession (PDP) solves the problem of determining whether the data stored in the cloud is maintained in its entirety. Certificateless cryptography simultaneously tackles two challenges: certificate management and key escrow. There are still three deficiencies in the current known certificateless provable data possession (CL-PDP) schemes. First, security proofs are typically conducted in the random oracle model (ROM). Second, some schemes are incapable of preventing third-party auditor (TPA) from recovering user data blocks. Third, most schemes require hash-to-point operations, which result in lower computational efficiency. In this article, we demonstrated two kinds of attacks targeting the scheme Ji et al. 2020. Subsequently, we put forward a new CL-PDP scheme and showed security proofs in the standard model (SM). Finally, we conducted performance analysis on ten CL-PDP schemes. Our scheme outperforms others in terms of efficiency, as it minimizes computational overhead by requiring only three pairing operations and eliminating the need for hash-to-point operations.