A Model of Harmful Yet Engaging Content on Social Media
George Beknazar-Yuzbashev, Rafael Jiménez-Durán, Mateusz Stalinski
Abstract
Why do social media users spend so much time consuming content that seemingly harms them? We build a simple model to argue that advertising-driven platforms can find it profitable to display content that harms users when it is complementary to their time spent on the platform. These incentives disappear, absent network effects, in the case of a subscription-based business model because harmful content reduces the willingness to pay for the platform. Our results warn against interpreting increases in engagement on social media as welfare increases.
Topics & Concepts
Content (measure theory)Social mediaComputer scienceInternet privacyPsychologyData scienceEnvironmental scienceWorld Wide WebMathematicsMathematical analysisOpinion Dynamics and Social InfluenceMisinformation and Its ImpactsSocial Media and Politics