Distributed Dynamic Event-Triggered Resilient Control for AC Microgrids Under FDI Attacks
Binjie Xia, Sha Fan, Lei Ding, Chao Deng
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the distributed resilient control problem of voltage and frequency restoration in AC microgrids (MGs) subject to false data injection (FDI) attacks under event-triggered communication. To solve the problem, new distributed dynamic event-triggered <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$ </tex-math></inline-formula> -step attack observers are primarily designed for the accurate estimation of attacks while avoiding continuous communication. Based on the observer state, cooperative resilient controllers for voltage and frequency restoration are proposed, and the convergence of the voltage and frequency of the AC MGs as well as the exclusion of Zeno behavior are proved theoretically. Different from the existing event-triggered resilient control methods in AC MGs subject to unknown bounded FDI attacks, the developed distributed dynamic event-triggered based <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$ </tex-math></inline-formula> -step attack observers and cooperative resilient controllers can guarantee accurate observation and compensation for FDI attacks. Finally, experimental tests are carried out to validate the effectiveness of the proposed control method, which demonstrates great resilience in maintaining stable operations under FDI attacks and represents a dramatic reduction in communication costs.