Explaining normative reasons

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support‐explanationism , for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ ‐ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism— ought‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons‐First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support‐explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non‐naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons‐First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’.

Topics & Concepts