ROV++: Improved Deployable Defense against BGP Hijacking
Reynaldo Morillo, Justin Furuness, Cameron Morris, J. T. Breslin, Amir Herzberg, Bing Wang
Abstract
We study and extend Route Origin Validation (ROV), the basis for the IETF defenses of interdomain routing. We focus on two important hijack attacks: subprefix hijacks and non-routed prefix hijacks. For both attacks, we show that, with partial deployment, ROV provides disappointing security benefits. We also present a new attack, superprefix hijacks, which completely circumvent ROV's defense for non-routed prefix hijacks.
Topics & Concepts
Remotely operated underwater vehicleComputer scienceComputer securityArtificial intelligenceRobotMobile robotMobile Agent-Based Network ManagementOpportunistic and Delay-Tolerant NetworksIoT and Edge/Fog Computing