False Phasor Data Detection Under Time Synchronization Attacks: A Neural Network Approach
Rong Huang, Yuancheng Li
Abstract
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) used in the smart grids are vulnerable to time synchronization attacks (TSA), whose attack target is the global positioning systems (GPS). The attacker manipulates phase measurements by sending deceptive GPS signals to introduce errors in state estimation, which can affect bus power flow calculation and economic dispatching of the power system. Considering the case of multiple attacked PMUs in AC, a novel false phase data detection method is proposed in this paper. The method uses “phase coding” to extract and encode the potential relationship between amplitude and phase angle, and then builds a TSAs detection model based on a vector neural network that learns the encoded relationship vectors through dynamic routing. Finally, simulation experiments are carried out on IEEE 9, 14, 30, and 118 bus systems and real measurements provided by a province in China. The results show that the proposed method achieves the best performance among the detection methods based on the learning model.