Energy Cooperation for Wind Farm and Hydrogen Refueling Stations: A RO-Based and Nash-Harsanyi Bargaining Solution
Yang Mi, Pengcheng Cai, Yang Fu, Peng Wang, Shunfu Lin
Abstract
Nowadays, with the rapid development of hydrogen powered vehicles, the demand for hydrogen refueling stations (HRSs) in the transportation field is growing. The renewable energy, e.g., wind energy, is used to produce and store hydrogen on site for HRSs, which may be a relatively cheap and clean solution. Considering the wind farm (WF) and HRSs belong to different entities, a new cooperative operation model of the WF-HRSs combined system is proposed. Specifically, the robust optimization methods are implemented to characterize the uncertainties of wind power and market electricity price, respectively, to alleviate risk. To ensure the fairness of profit allocation, the bargaining power is measured by various contribution levels of each stakeholder based on the Nash–Harsanyi bargaining game theory. Furthermore, the model is transformed into two sequential subproblems: energy trading problem (SP1) and the payment bargaining problem (SP2). Accordingly, a solving technique adopting column and constraint generation algorithm is provided to solve the SP1. In addition, for the sake of privacy protection, a distributed approach based on data-centric mode is developed to solve SP2. Finally, the numerical results can validate the effectiveness and scalability for the proposed scheme and algorithms.