Coupled Evolutionary Behavioral and Disease Dynamics Under Reinfection Risk
Abhisek Satapathi, Narendra Kumar Dhar, Ashish R. Hota, Vaibhav Srivastava
Abstract
We study the interplay between epidemic dynamics and human decision making for epidemics that involve reinfection risk; in particular, the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) and the susceptible-infected-recovered-infected (SIRI) epidemic models. In the proposed game-theoretic setting, individuals choose whether to adopt protection or not based on the trade-off between the cost of adopting protection and the risk of infection; the latter depends on the current epidemic prevalence and the fraction of individuals who adopt protection in the population. We define the coupled epidemic-behavioral dynamics by modeling the evolution of individual protection adoption behavior according to the replicator dynamics. For the SIS epidemic, we fully characterize the equilibria and their stability properties. We further analyze the coupled dynamics under timescale separation when individual behavior evolves faster than the epidemic, and characterize the equilibria of the resulting discontinuous hybrid system for both SIS and SIRI models. Numerical results illustrate how the coupled dynamics exhibits oscillatory behavior and convergence to sliding mode solutions in suitable parameter regimes.