TOTAL: Optimal Protection Strategy Against Perfect and Imperfect False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid Cyber–Physical Systems
Jiwei Tian, Buhong Wang, Tengyao Li, Fute Shang, Kunrui Cao, Rongxiao Guo
Abstract
This article explores the problem of protection against false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on the power system state estimation. Although many research works have been reported previously to solve the same problem, yet most of them are only for perfect FDIAs. To address the problem reasonably, all related factors influencing the success probability and corresponding attack impact of imperfect FDIAs should also be considered. Based on such considerations, a topology, parameter, accuracy, level (TOTAL) protection strategy considering all corresponding factors is proposed. The TOTAL protection strategy minimizes the attack impact of typical imperfect FDIAs (single measurement attacks) while defending against typical perfect FDIAs (single-state variable attacks). Depending on whether the protection scheme contains phasor measurement units (PMUs), we formulate the meter selection as a linear binary programming or integer programming problem, which can be solved by suitable solvers. The proposed strategy is compared with the existing methods in the literature and evaluated using the standard IEEE test cases.