Helix: A Fair Blockchain Consensus Protocol Resistant to Ordering Manipulation
David Yakira, Avi Asayag, Gad Cohen, Ido Grayevsky, Maya Leshkowitz, Ori Rottenstreich, Ronen Tamari
Abstract
We present <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Helix</i> , a blockchain-based consensus protocol for <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">fair</i> ordering of transactions among nodes in a distributed network. Helix advances in rounds, in each an elected primary node proposes a potential block (a successive set of transactions). For being included in the blockchain, a block must pass validation by an elected committee of nodes. Nodes have two primary preferences. First, to be elected as committee members. Additionally, because each transaction is associated with one of the network nodes, nodes would like to prioritize their own transactions over those of others. Our definition of fairness incorporates three key elements. First, the process of electing nodes to committees is random and unpredictable. Second, a correlated sampling scheme is used to guarantee random selection and ordering of pending transactions in blocks. Third, transactions are encrypted to hide their associations with nodes and prevent censorship. Through the corresponding threshold decryption process we obtain an unpredictable and non-manipulable randomness beacon, which serves both the election process and the correlated sampling scheme. We define a quantitative measure of fairness in the protocol, prove theoretically that fairness manipulation in Helix is significantly limited, and present experiments evaluating fairness in practice.