An irreducible understanding of animal dignity
Simon Coghlan
Abstract
Alongside lively philosophical debate about human dignity (Etinson, 2020; Rosen, 2012), several philosophers have begun asking whether “dignity” could also illuminate our moral relations with nonhuman animals (e.g., Abbate, 2020; Anderson, 2005; Gruen, 2014; Humphreys, 2016; Nussbaum, 2006; Ortiz, 2004). Increasing talk of animal dignity is also occurring in public and even legal discourse (Kotzmann & Seery, 2017). For example, in a recent habeas corpus hearing for a Bronx Zoo elephant, a Judge declared that the elephant is “a dignified creature” but “there is nothing dignified about her captivity” (Wilson, 2022, p. 4). Such language is perhaps beginning to resonate more with people than it once did. Nonetheless, some philosophers seriously doubt that dignity is a coherent and useful moral idea (Zuolo, 2016). Dressing circus-kept animals in human clothes and laughing at them may strike modern people as cruelly demeaning to those nonhumans. Yet for critics, these apparent assaults on “dignity” are ethically trivial or else merely indirect wrongs—objectionable only because such treatment could upset human witnesses or generally promote animal exploitation (Martin, 2019, p. 94). According to dignity's critics, other moral concepts can far better explain what is wrong with that treatment. Dignity is a complex notion and providing lucid accounts is challenging. Furthermore, philosophical analysis of animal dignity is relatively limited. It warrants greater attention. In this paper, I explore an understanding of animal dignity that seems to be irreducible to a range of other moral concepts and to some other conceptions of dignity. The understanding I explore appears to be a sui generis notion that involves a special kind of non-natural harm and assault upon animals. This special or distinctive harm and assault is related to the cognate notions of defiling, degrading, demeaning, dishonoring, and honoring treatment. Presenting this sui generis understanding requires examining arguably the most compelling current account of animal dignity on offer—a “relational” conception of dignity as social respect or status. Although very important, I shall ask whether there is also another “relational” way of understanding dignity that is irreducible even to that account—although importantly it might complement and deepen it. This suggests that more than one ethically important way of conceiving of dignity is possible. In the following, I outline criticisms of animal dignity with a focus on reductionist attacks, identify a social conception of dignity, reflect on some key examples of human behavior that seem to facilitate understanding of animal dignity, briefly introduce positive forms of irreducible dignity, and consider several objections, before concluding. Like “human dignity” (Cochrane, 2010), “animal dignity” may be attacked as merely rhetorical or as an excessively indeterminate concept. Dignity could mean, for example, inherent value, virtue, social rank, bodily integrity, autonomy…and much more (Schroeder, 2010). However, as I attempt to do below, dignity might be more carefully specified to avoid damaging vagueness. Some pro-animal thinkers worry that “dignity” is too closely associated with higher human abilities and the denigration of nonhumans. Dignity talk, says Will Kymlicka (2018, p. 771), “is saturated with the idea that dignity involves not being treated as an animal.” This is true of some analyses of human dignity (e.g., Kateb, 2011), but perhaps there are approaches that avoid throwing animals “under the bus” (Kymlicka, 2018, p. 779)—and that even enlarge our respect for animals. Both human and animal dignity are targets of a reductionist attack by philosophers who are dismissive and sometimes damning of the concept. For example, some philosophers have forcefully claimed that human dignity is a useless concept that simply means respect for persons or autonomy (Macklin, 2003). The reductionist critic says that “dignity,” while apparently fine sounding, is ultimately uninformative and replaceable with more fundamental and valuable moral ideas. Federico Zuolo (2016), for instance, argues that reductionism undermines recent characterizations of animal dignity by Michael Meyer and Martha Nussbaum. Meyer (2001) proposes a Kant-inspired “simple dignity,” which identifies animal dignity with inherent or intrinsic moral worth. While Kant connected dignity with rational autonomy, the “simple dignity” account says that even without rational autonomy or moral equality with humans, sentient nonhumans nevertheless possess intrinsic worth. They thus also have a dignity (Meyer, 2001, p. 120). Such dignity may also ground various rights and be offended when a nonhuman dignity-bearer is used as a mere means (see Humphreys, 2016). Unlike Meyer, Nussbaum (2006) locates dignity in natural wellbeing and species-typical flourishing. For Nussbaum, dignity involves the realization of various natural animal capabilities—such as emotional expression, play, health, and relationships—that we recognize as important. A life without dignity, on Nussbaum's account, is one that lacks these possibilities for natural flourishing. Thus, animals, like humans, also have dignity. Zuolo attacks Michael Meyer's “simple dignity” as reducible to broad notions of moral considerability and Martha Nussbaum's account as reducible to natural living and wellbeing. Zuolo concludes that animal dignity lacks a distinctive ethical meaning and is best replaced with more informative concepts (Zuolo, 2016, p. 1119). Perhaps this attack is unfairly reductionist. For example, one might say that Nussbaum's naturalistic conception of dignity is not just about natural wellbeing but is also by a of and of and p. Nonetheless, we might that “dignity” too distinctive in accounts which are on natural wellbeing and intrinsic This the that of dignity can better For even on or to like intrinsic moral and natural living and might also and of human and that those distinctive or these we may doubt on reductionist that to talk of dignity. can In kind of dignity that be to more concepts may be as or It be for to say about an irreducible understanding of dignity might be important and valuable we a more the of this I one important social conception of by animal and it with a sui generis understanding these and about animal dignity. 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Some of our examples that not of dignity (e.g., the examples of and the perhaps the and of animals on and sui generis and For example, we may as or the of of animal in with like and our and and and in our we might to such treatment as a distinctive kind of non-natural that the or natural and our and A might consider it an to or on animals them and only or not this to we like those living but animals with them and for them may a even when are not of human animals, like have have by or have it people might it to them in This is do for animals when them and them in it is not to that a notion of a distinctive and irreducible dignity could the way we animals. The that dignity not the of animal rights (Kymlicka, 2018, p. and is in discourse arguably the moral and nonhumans. It is for example, that the as p. that do not animals the of respect treatment that we to is of moral that animals, like humans, are to being and may to the moral we Perhaps a conception of dignity irreducible to moral like and have the kind of as and Kymlicka p. pro-animal have dignity not be a trivial or moral concept. of in which people to of the defiling, degrading, demeaning, and treatment of perhaps of honoring and an understanding of dignity irreducible to moral such as naturalistic of and notions of intrinsic moral and respect for autonomy, and It thus appears to at some reductionist A sui generis we can be a valuable social account of dignity, which it might complement and A notion of irreducible animal dignity may that it is to and trivial or to our relations with animals. Perhaps such an understanding of dignity may even our moral understanding of and relations with nonhuman animals. I for very the by The of as of the The of the of This The of is a and at the of on animal and