Conceptual issues with the moral foundation of Purity: The case of religion
Damien L. Crone
Abstract
The moral foundation of Purity sits at the center of much moral psychology research, yet the role of religion in Purity’s definition is ambiguous. Here, I raise three substantial, interrelated concerns about the implied role of religiosity in the Purity foundation, highlighting empirical findings demonstrating these concerns, and then argue in favor of a more restrictive definition. Specifically, including religion as an inherent feature of Purity (1) risks making the foundation overly inclusive, operationally intractable, and redundant with the Authority foundation, (2) renders the Purity foundation largely irrelevant to the disgust-based Behavioral Immune System to which the Purity foundation’s evolutionary origins are attributed, and (3) based on common operationalizations of Moral Foundations Theory, produces biased measurements and misleading findings. Taken together these definitional concerns suggest the need to reconsider the definition and operationalization of the Purity foundation, opting for a more circumscribed role for religion. Such efforts will have widespread implications for moral foundations research, but will ultimately allow for greater clarity about the nature of Purity.