Machine economies
Eduard Hartwich, Alexander Rieger, Johannes Sedlmeir, Dominik Jurek, Gilbert Fridgen
Abstract
Abstract This fundamentals article discusses efficient machine economies in which non-human agents can autonomously exchange information and value. We first identify criteria for achieving Pareto efficiency in such economies by drawing on the Coase Theorem. We then translate these economic criteria to technical requirements before developing a framework that characterizes four types of machine economies. We discuss real-life examples for each type to highlight key challenges in achieving Pareto efficiency. In particular, we highlight that machine economies with human involvement in economic interactions and governance face significant challenges regarding perfect information, rationality, and transaction costs. Machine economies without human involvement, in turn, promise a high degree of Pareto efficiency, but there are still many open questions, particularly regarding machine-enforced governance. We conclude with opportunities for future research on the interactions and governance in machine economies.