Sniffing visible light communication through walls
Minhao Cui, Yuda Feng, Qing Wang, Jie Xiong
Abstract
Visible light communication (VLC) is gaining a significant amount of interest as a new paradigm to meet rapidly increasing demands on wireless capacity required by a digitalized world. VLC is considered as a secure wireless communication scheme because VLC signals can be easily constrained within physical boundaries. In this paper, for the first time, we show that VLC is not as secure as people thought: VLC can be sniffed through walls! The key principle behind this is that in VLC transmissions, a VLC transmitter not only emits visible light signals but also leaks out 'side channel RF signals'. The leaked RF signals can be sniffed by a receiver to decode the VLC transmissions even the receiver is blocked (e.g., by walls) from the VLC transmitter. In this work, we establish a theoretical model to quantify the amplitude of the leaked RF signal and verify the model with comprehensive experiments. We design and implement a VLC sniffing system including receiver coil design, signal processing and frame decoding, spanning across hardware and software. Field studies show that with a cheap receiver design, our system can simultaneously sniff transmissions from multiple VLC transmitters 6.4 meters away with a 14 cm concrete wall in between, where the distance exceeds the communication range of most state-of-the-art VLC systems. By simply twining a wired earphone on the arm, we can sniff the VLC transmission 1.9 meters away.