Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities
Frank Hofmann
Abstract
Abstract In this paper I present an account of the rational abilities that make our decisions free. Following the lead of new dispositionalists, a leeway account of free decisions is developed, and the rational abilities that ground our abilities to decide otherwise are described in detail. A main result will be that the best account of the relevant rational abilities makes them two-way abilities: abilities to decide to do or not to do x in accordance with one’s apparent reasons. Dispositionalism about rational abilities will be vindicated, since it helps to see why and how these two-way abilities entail an ability to decide otherwise and, thus, free will.
Topics & Concepts
Philosophy of medicineRational planning modelFree willRational analysisComputer scienceRational expectationsEpistemologyManagement sciencePsychologyCognitionEconomicsPhilosophyEconometricsPathologyManagementAlternative medicineMedicineNeuroscienceFree Will and AgencyPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryPhilosophy and Theoretical Science