The PROUST hypothesis: the embodiment of olfactory cognition
Lucia F. Jacobs
Abstract
The extension of cognition beyond the brain to the body and beyond the body to the environment is an area of debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Yet, these debates largely overlook olfaction, a sensory modality used by most animals. Here, I use the philosopher's framework to explore the implications of embodiment for olfactory cognition. The philosopher's 4E framework comprises embodied cognition, emerging from a nervous system characterized by its interactions with its body. The necessity of action for perception adds enacted cognition. Cognition is further embedded in the sensory inputs of the individual and is extended beyond the individual to information stored in its physical and social environments. Further, embodiment must fulfill the criterion of mutual manipulability, where an agent's cognitive state is involved in continual, reciprocal influences with its environment. Cognition cannot be understood divorced from evolutionary history, however, and I propose adding evolved, as a fifth term to the 4E framework. We must, therefore, begin at the beginning, with chemosensation, a sensory modality that underlies purposive behavior, from bacteria to humans. The PROUST hypothesis (perceiving and reconstructing odor utility in space and time) describers how olfaction, this ancient scaffold and common denominator of animal cognition, fulfills the criteria of embodied cognition. Olfactory cognition, with its near universal taxonomic distribution as well as the near absence of conscious representation in humans, may offer us the best sensorimotor system for the study of embodiment.